



ON ALBERT HOURANI, THE ARAB OFFICE, AND THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMITTEE OF 1946

WALID KHALIDI

This historical narrative mixed with personal reminiscences, undertaken to provide background for Albert Hourani's testimony before the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry elsewhere in this issue, focuses closely on the decade or so that precedes the committee's hearings in 1946. In recounting the establishment of the committee and the Arab Office (which Hourani represented), the author highlights the complex interaction between the local, regional, and international dimensions: the intra-Palestinian (involving primarily Haj Amin al-Husayni, Musa Alami, and Jamal Husayni), the regional (involving especially Nuri Pasha al-Said of Iraq), and the international (especially the process by which the United States began to replace Britain as the pacesetter of events in postwar Palestine). A supporting cast includes George Antonius, Ahmad Hilmi Pasha, Hussein Fakhry Khalidi, Ahmad Shukayri, and Wasfi Tall.

THIS YEAR MARKS the ninetieth anniversary of Albert Hourani's birth in Didsbury, south Manchester, England, on 31 March 1915. Already twelve years have passed since his death in Oxford on 17 January 1993.

I first met Albert in Jerusalem some time in 1944 when I was nineteen—ten years his junior. The meeting took place at his request. I was flattered to be asked to see him, since his reputation for brilliance was the talk of the city's Arab and Anglo-Arab circles; though based in Cairo, he was a frequent visitor to Jerusalem. This was wartime, and Albert, as a British subject, had been drafted. Because of his background he was made Assistant Advisor on Arab Affairs to the British Minister of State resident in Cairo. The minister held cabinet rank, reporting directly to Churchill. Albert's immediate superior was the legendary Brigadier Iltyd Clayton, outside of whose office, it was said, queues of Arab leaders and politicians could be seen every day (and night) of the week. Albert's counterpart on Jewish affairs was the South African Aubrey (later Abba) Eban.

I had known two of Albert's brothers, George and Cecil, before meeting him. I assume that they had mentioned me to him. Cecil I had met by chance in a book shop in Bab Edriss in Beirut, soon after the recapture of Lebanon from the Vichy forces. We started a casual conversation and have been friends

WALID KHALIDI, a founder of the Institute for Palestine Studies and its general secretary, is a former professor at Oxford University, American University of Beirut, and Harvard.

ever since. George I got to know after his appointment as lecturer in classics at the Arab College in Jerusalem, of which my father was principal. Although I did not attend the college itself, the principal's residence where I still lived was just behind it, and on one occasion when George was ill I took over his Latin class for a day or two. My proficiency in Latin (long dissipated) was entirely due to the draconian tutorship of W. J. Farrell. Farrell had been a classics fellow at Jesus College, Cambridge, and was director of education in Palestine. He saw me through the exams in Latin and Greek and Roman history for an external BA degree from London University, travel to the UK in wartime being out of the question.

My meeting with Albert took place at Karm al-Mufti (the Mufti's Vineyard). This was a charming stone villa built by Haj Amin al-Husayni, the mufti of Jerusalem, for his own residence. It stood in a large garden on the southern slope of Shaykh Jarrah overlooking the Old City on the way to Mount Scopus and the World War I cemetery. Because of political and security exigencies, the Mufti never actually lived in the house, and he rented it (and subsequently sold it) to his confidant George Antonius. George had died in 1942 and the house was occupied by his widow Katy (daughter of Faris Nimr Pasha, the Lebanese-born proprietor of the Cairene daily *al-Mukattam*) and their only daughter Sourayyah (Tutu). Katy, a vivacious, wittily sharp-tongued, and lavish hostess, held court at Karm al-Mufti, coaxing Palestinian leaders and professionals and senior British military and civilian staff and their wives to socialize with one another.

When I turned up for the meeting with Albert, who was staying as a house guest at Karm al-Mufti, I was ushered by a Nubian waiter into a book-lined sitting room furnished with upper class Victorian taste. A few minutes passed before Albert walked in, his face slightly flushed, looking a touch ecclesiastical. I do not remember what we discussed, only that we ranged over many topics. His low voice, courtesy, his confident tone and manner, and his intelligent, measured comments all made a lasting impression on me. The meeting went on for over an hour, and we agreed to stay in touch.

Soon Albert joined a small "ecumenical" circle of friends which met regularly in Jerusalem at its "headquarters," the bar of the King David Hotel. It included my then fiancée, Rasha Salaam, myself, Wolfgang Hildesheimer, Julian Asquith, Anne Palairt, my sister Sulafa, Afif Boulos, Jabra Ibrahim Jabra, John Sheringham and his wife Yvette (whose sister was George Hourani's wife), Wolfgang's friend Sally Kassab, and Luli Abul Huda; Julian, Anne, Luli, and Albert had been friends since their Oxford days. Another member of the group was Freddie Blenkinsop, a senior official in the Secretariat (Executive) who unfailingly, on 2 November of each year, circulated to his British colleagues a refutation of the Balfour Declaration on the anniversary of its issuance. Freddie died in the rubble of the Secretariat wing of the King David Hotel when it was blown up by Menahem Begin's Irgun in July 1946. I remember an evening in Luli's flat where we all sat around on the floor listening to Albert read T. S. Eliot's *Wasteland* by candlelight. During this period, Albert gave me a number

of manuscripts he had written about nationalist politics in Syria-Lebanon and on Christian minorities, which I subsequently recognized in published format as *Syria and Lebanon: A Political Essay* (1946) and *Minorities in the Arab World* (1947).

* * *

These reminiscences were begun as an introduction to the testimony that Albert, representing the newly created Arab Office, gave before the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry in Jerusalem in March 1946. His testimony remains to this day a powerfully argued statement of Arab opposition to the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine, while at the same time revealing Albert's deep convictions about the Palestine problem. But the original intention was soon left behind: in trying to set the stage for the testimony by telling the story of the establishment of the Arab Office and the Anglo-American Committee, the "introduction" continued to grow beyond reasonable limits. Thus it was decided to publish these reflections separately, in parallel with Albert's testimony, to give it some context and in the hope of shedding some light on the complexities of the period.

ON THE EVE OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMITTEE'S FORMATION

Those were momentous times. Globally, the war had come to an end four months before the Anglo-American Committee was established. Clement Attlee's Labor government had taken over from Winston Churchill. The United Nations was created and, with Franklin D. Roosevelt dead, Harry Truman was now president. Regionally, French rule in Syria and Lebanon had ended, and the Arab League was created. Locally, the Palestinians were leaderless—the Mufti, a fugitive from Britain since 1937, did not reappear from the Axis countries until his surprise arrival in Egypt in April 1946. Meanwhile, David Ben-Gurion, unquestionably the supremo of the Yishuv, was assiduously preparing, in coordination with the American Jewish establishment, for the eventuality of war against both the Brits and the Arabs.

More specifically, the new British foreign secretary, Ernest Bevin, an erstwhile Zionist, began to see the Middle East in a different light once in charge of policy. His task was to forge a viable postwar regional strategy for Britain in the face of heightened Soviet and American influence as well as mounting Zionist militancy and terrorism, while trying to meet Arab expectations greatly raised by the creation of the Arab League. In Palestine, his challenge was what to do with the 1939 White Paper, Britain's statement of intent on its Palestine policy issued by the Neville Chamberlain government less than four months before the outbreak of World War II, and which Ben-Gurion was bent on burying. As had been true since the beginning of Zionism in the late nineteenth century, the crucial issue in Palestine was Jewish immigration. Contrary to still prevailing belief, the 75,000 immigration certificates authorized by the White Paper

had not all been used by the end of the war because of war conditions (closure of borders, impossibility or insecurity of sea travel, etc.), but the issue was the *principle* of immigration: the White Paper had stipulated that after the admission of 75,000 immigrants, further Jewish immigration would be contingent on Arab “acquiescence,” which clearly would not be forthcoming.

Meanwhile, inter-Arab tensions were hearty and well. Broadly speaking, two coalitions faced each other across the Arab League. On one side were the two Hashemite monarchies of Iraq and Transjordan, supported by loosely organized monarchists and pan-Arabists in Greater Syria. On the other side were the Saudi and Egyptian royal houses, supported by republican and newly independent Syria and Lebanon. The Palestinians were caught in between.

There were other inter-Arab complexities as well. Palestinian pan-Arabists (particularly members of the Istiqlal party) had encouraged the creation of the Arab League via their Iraqi contacts, but were wary of the Hashemites’ pro-British proclivities.¹ Tension between Emir Abdallah of Transjordan (declared King in May 1946) and Palestinian supporters of Haj Amin (the “*majlisiyyun*” — the name derives from the fact that Haj Amin, in addition to being Mufti of Jerusalem, was also head of the Supreme Muslim Council, or *Majlis*) had been building ever since the Royal (Peel) Commission of 1936 had recommended the partition of Palestine into a Jewish state and an Arab state, with the latter to be annexed by Transjordan. Concurrently, the Palestinian opponents of Haj Amin (the “*mu’aridun*,” from an Arabic verb meaning to oppose) had drawn closer to Abdallah. Bad blood between the Iraqi Hashemites (particularly the Regent Abdullilah and perennial Iraqi strongman Nuri Pasha al-Said) and Haj Amin had flown copiously because of Haj Amin’s key role in the Rashid Ali coup d’état that had temporarily ousted the monarchy in April 1941. This had been reversed only by British military intervention, which in turn had precipitated Haj Amin’s flight to Iran and thence to Germany and Italy for the duration of the war.

MUSA ALAMI AND THE ARAB OFFICE SCHEME

Musa Alami was a scion of an old Sufi Jerusalem family and the only son of Faidi Alami, a former mayor of Jerusalem under the Ottomans and one of the three Jerusalem deputies in the last Ottoman parliament. Conscripted into the Ottoman army in October 1914 as a private, Musa was transferred to the censor’s office in Jerusalem because of his proficiency in French and English.² He was the first Palestinian to attend Cambridge University (Trinity Hall) and to be admitted to the Inner Temple. He was called to the Bar in 1924.³ Upon his return to Palestine, he was appointed junior crown counsel⁴ and later acting solicitor general.⁵ He had attracted the attention of British High Commissioner Sir Arthur Wauchope, who made him his private secretary on Arab affairs.⁶ The Jewish leaders, alarmed by this appointment, campaigned so vigorously against it in London and Washington that within a year Wauchope was forced to return Musa to the legal department.⁷ Nevertheless, in the mid 1930s, he had acted as intermediary in inconclusive negotiations between Ben-Gurion

and Haj Amin, which the former broke off.⁸ It was Musa who, with George Antonius,⁹ drafted the remarkable memorandum signed by all the Arab senior officials and submitted to the high commissioner in 1936, which politely but firmly exposed the injustice of British policy in Palestine.¹⁰ Not long afterwards, and at Jewish prompting, the Royal (Peel) Commission criticized the office of the solicitor general (i.e., Musa) for leniency in prosecuting Arab guerrillas and recommended the appointment of a Brit to that position. In 1937 Musa was brusquely dismissed from his post and asked to leave the country.¹¹

Musa was nonetheless permitted by Britain to join the Palestinian delegation to the 1939 London Round Table Conference that led to the issuance of the White Paper. Indeed, he played an important role in talks with the colonial secretary, Malcolm MacDonald, about the composition of the Palestinian delegation.¹² The British had adamantly refused to allow Haj Amin (who remained in exile for the duration of the Mandate) to attend the conference, but allowed Jamal Husayni, his cousin and Musa's brother-in-law, to head the delegation. Jamal was also the head of *al-hizb al-'arabi*, the largest Palestinian political party and the backbone of the *majlisiyyun*. (Many years later, Jamal was my summer neighbor in Shemlan, Lebanon, and he told me shortly before his death in 1982 that Musa, whom he considered a genius, and George Antonius had been the main Arab strategists at the conference.) The delegates of the other Arab countries who attended the Round Table Conference included Nuri Pasha and Emir (later King) Faisal of Saudi Arabia. Nuri had been a frequent visitor to Palestine in the 1930s and had played a key role mediating between Haj Amin and the British in 1936 to end the Arab general strike. He almost certainly worked closely with Musa on this, and the relationship between the two could only have been consolidated at the London conference.

The truce mediated by Nuri lasted only until the publication in 1937 of the Peel Report, when the second phase of the rebellion exploded in outrage against the report's partition recommendation. The escalation led to the banning that same year of the Arab Higher Committee (AHC), established two years earlier under the leadership of Haj Amin, as well as the arrest or exile of its members. Haj Amin himself had fled to Lebanon, where the French, to spite the British, not only tolerated his presence but looked the other way as he presided over the continuing guerrilla warfare in Palestine. But at the outbreak of World War II, the French asked Haj Amin to leave. Musa and Jamal, who were also in Lebanon as fugitives, were asked to leave at the same time. Haj Amin sought refuge in Iraq, where he instantly attracted a coterie of admiring Iraqi civilian and military leaders. Musa and Jamal joined him there.

In July 1940, Lord Lloyd, an Arabist who was colonial secretary in Churchill's first government, sent an emissary, Colonel S. F. Newcombe, an Arabist who had served with T. E. Lawrence, to Baghdad to persuade Haj Amin to endorse the 1939 White Paper with a view to reducing Anglo-Arab tensions in the region (Haj Amin having led the opposition to it). Newcombe's instructions were to win Nuri Pasha's approval of the mission, during which he was authorized to communicate with Jamal and Musa but not with Haj Amin. Musa and Jamal

worked in tandem with Nuri Pasha to ensure the mission's success. According to Musa, Haj Amin was prevailed upon to accept (reluctantly) the White Paper as part of a larger package. This included a pledge to the British by Nuri Pasha, as prime minister, to put the Iraqi armed forces at Britain's disposal in the war against the Axis if a *modus vivendi* were reached with Haj Amin. In the circumstances, no clear response came from Britain to the Newcombe-Haj Amin "deal," most probably because of Churchill's opposition.¹³ There is also a possibility that Newcombe exceeded his terms of reference.¹⁴

Haj Amin, at least partly because of London's negative response to the Baghdad negotiations, was soon in the thick with Rashid Ali Kilani and his military co-conspirators, and at the beginning of April, the Regent Abdulilham had to flee for his life.¹⁵ When the British reentered Iraq the following month, Haj Amin and Jamal both fled to Iran where the latter was arrested by the British and exiled to southern Rhodesia; he was not allowed to return to Palestine until February 1946. The Mufti continued on to Turkey en route to the Axis countries. Meanwhile, Musa found his way back to Lebanon and finally to Jerusalem, where he remained for the rest of the war.

The crushing of the Rashid Ali coup exacerbated the already growing Arab animosity toward Britain over its Palestine policies. In January 1943 Nuri Pasha, again prime minister, declared war on the Axis.¹⁶ In a bid to win over pan-Arab sentiment, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, himself an Arabist, stated in parliament the next month that Britain would not oppose an attempt at closer Arab unity between the Arab countries if it commanded "general approval."¹⁷ Iraq under Nuri Pasha's leadership was the first to take the cue, initiating inter-Arab talks which evinced a response from Mustafa Nahhas Pasha, the Wafdist prime minister of Egypt. By October 1944 a preparatory conference was getting underway in Alexandria, attended by delegates from Iraq, Transjordan, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. With the Palestine problem a primary concern throughout the Arab world, the issue of Palestinian participation in the conference came to the fore.

It was at this stage that Musa Alami reemerged on the political stage. Because he was unaffiliated with any of the six Palestinian parties, while being close to Jamal Husayni, he was unanimously chosen as the Palestinian delegate to the Alexandria preparatory conference by the representatives of the other parties. The Palestinian leader who nominated Musa to this position was my uncle, Dr. Hussein Fakhri Khalidi, the founder and secretary of the Reform (*islah*) Party and member of the AHC. In 1935 he had been elected mayor of Jerusalem (the first and last to be freely elected by both Jews and Arabs) after the Khalidis had joined forces with the Husaynis to oust the British-appointed Raghیب Bey Nashashibi from the mayoralty. When the British dissolved the AHC in 1937, Hussein Fakhri was arrested and exiled with others, mostly AHC members, to the Seychelles Islands in the Indian Ocean. He was released from exile to attend the 1939 London conference, where he worked closely with Musa, Jamal Husayni, and George Antonius and was allowed back to Palestine in 1943.

The unanimous choice of Musa as the Palestinian representative at the Alexandria preparatory conference was too good to be true for Nuri Pasha, Iraq's delegate there. Musa surpassed himself at the conference.¹⁸ He delivered a masterly speech, which was a narration, diagnosis, and prescription all in one. He explained that Britain was contemplating four options for post-war Palestine: partition into two states, partition into cantons, the creation of a Jewish numerical majority, or the creation of numerical parity between the two communities. All these options constituted a repudiation of the 1939 White Paper, a repudiation, according to Musa, motivated by Britain's conviction that "the Arabs were pusillanimous and frivolous in their contentions over Palestine and that there was no danger in antagonizing them." Musa went on to describe the negotiations in Iraq with Colonel Newcombe in 1940 and urged the Arab countries to insist on the implementation of the 1939 White Paper, emphasizing that "the Baghdad Agreement of 1940" was "binding" on Britain. At one point in his exposition he enigmatically referred to the role of "a third party" (i.e., Nuri Pasha) but coyly added that he could not elaborate without authorization, whereupon Nuri Pasha dramatically gave him the green light to make the revelation about his pledge to Britain.¹⁹ This was a high point of the conference, and it underlined the extent of the orchestration between Nuri and Musa.

Musa explained the seriousness of the land question and the exclusivist legislation on which the Zionist land acquisition policy was based (i.e., the Jewish National Fund statutes).²⁰ He recommended that an Arab Development Society (*al-mashru 'al-insba'i*) immediately be established with an initial capital of £5 million to be contributed over five years by the member states. The funds were to go as grants or low interest loans to Palestinian farmers and villagers to help them develop their lands and prevent their alienation to the Jews. He also recommended that information offices immediately be opened in the major Western capitals to counter Zionist propaganda and misinformation. Musa made a profound impression on the assembled Arab leaders. They endorsed in principle all his recommendations and reaffirmed their endorsement when the Arab League Council met the following year, allotting £2 million for the offices.²¹ But it was Nuri who, under the cover of this endorsement, scrambled to supply the wherewithal for the execution of Musa's Development Society and Arab Offices ideas without coordinating with the other member states. He arranged for the transfer to Musa of £250,000 for the Development Society for the first two years and an undisclosed sum for the Arab Offices.²² Nuri made Musa solely accountable for expenditure in his own personal capacity.²³

Nuri's motivation was not altogether pristine. Certainly, by any standard Musa was outstanding, and in Palestine few measured up to him in pedigree, education, and experience. Politically he was independent, secular, liberal. His integrity was unassailable. Through his wife (a Jabiri of Aleppo), he was connected with elite political families of Syria and Lebanon. (Riad al-Solh's wife was also a Jabiri.) He was no republican ideologue and was essentially "grata" to the British despite the shoddy treatment meted out to him. At forty-eight he was

at the height of his physical vigor. Nuri had also known Musa and worked with him for at least a decade. It was tempting for Nuri and the Regent in Baghdad (and the British?) to view him as a counterweight to Haj Amin—their nemesis since the Rashid Ali affair. But his empowerment, through exclusive personal funding for the Development Society and Arab Office schemes, was too blatant. Musa envisaged opening Arab Offices in Jerusalem, London, Washington, Paris, and Moscow. In the nature of things, they would have to deal, in addition to the Palestine problem, with a whole range of issues affecting relations between the various Arab countries and these capitals. The obvious authority for such offices was the Arab League Secretariat. In retrospect, it seems to me quite extraordinary that Musa, with his well trained legal mind and political savvy, should have gone along with Nuri's sole sponsorship, given the very foreseeable opposition such an arrangement would arouse not only among the other League member states but also from the other Palestinian leaders. Probably Musa's naïve idealism was responsible. He was convinced he could do a better job than anyone else, which was no doubt true, but he was dealing with jealous sovereign states and turf-conscious Palestinian colleagues. I remember asking Jamal Husayni about this in Shemlan. He smiled and said: "Nuri thought he could manipulate Musa, but it was Musa who was manipulating him." I wonder.

THE U.S. ENTERS THE SCENE: THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMITTEE

This is where Albert Hourani comes in. Albert was demobilized at the end of the war, just as Musa was gearing up to implement his Arab Office plan. Musa wanted him to head research at the Jerusalem office, which was to be the Arab Office headquarters. It is not surprising that he thought of Albert. Albert had graduated from Oxford in 1936 with a first class honors degree in Politics, Philosophy, and Economics and afterwards had taken up a lectureship at the American University of Beirut (AUB). Almost certainly Musa's attendance of the Alexandria preparatory conference and later the Arab League Council would have brought the two of them into contact since Albert's boss, Brigadier Clayton, was closely involved in launching the League in implementation of Eden's policy. They may also have met earlier during the 1939 London conference: if Albert had been back in England from the AUB while the conference was in session, he would certainly have gone to see Antonius, whom he immensely admired, and would have met Musa. I kick myself for not ferreting out their first point of contact from either of them, when I had hundreds of opportunities to do so. At all events, Albert accepted the job. It is not surprising that he should have done so. The Palestinian cause resonated with Arabs generally, and Albert grew up in an Arab home, his parents having been from Marja'uyun, a Lebanese town on the border with Palestine. His father Fadlo (a textile merchant whom I later came to know) was not an Arab nationalist in the activist sense but he was a public spirited Arab patriot. Albert had met Luli Abul Huda, a passionate supporter of the Palestinian cause, at Oxford and indeed became enamored of her. And as a lecturer at the AUB, he came in contact with a whole

generation of dedicated pan-Arab and pan-Syrian nationalists from all over the Fertile Crescent, not to mention the ideologue of secular pan-Arabism, Constantine Zurayk, who was an associate professor of history there.

The Arab Office opened in October–November 1945. By that time, the situation in Palestine was rapidly deteriorating under the weight of a two-pronged Zionist grand offensive focused on Britain: pressure through the White House via its new incumbent, Harry Truman, and calibrated terrorism in the field. The immediate objective was to shred the 1939 White Paper through massive Jewish immigration, legal and illegal, as a prelude to the final thrust to establish the Jewish state, making the fullest use of the Holocaust. As early as 1942, Ben-Gurion signaled through the Biltmore Conference in New York that to achieve this end it was time to change the British horse for an American mount.²⁴ And Truman seemed quite willing.

Truman wasted little time before making his first move on Palestine. On 24 July, within weeks of assuming the presidency, he dispatched a letter on the subject to Churchill. But the Tories had lost the 6 July 1945 parliamentary elections, and on 26 July Churchill was succeeded as prime minister by Labor leader Clement Attlee, who found Truman's letter waiting the day he assumed office.²⁵ The second sentence in the letter referred to "the drastic restrictions imposed on Jewish immigration by the British White Paper of May 1939." Truman said he hoped that the British government "may find it possible without delay to take steps to lift the restrictions of the White Paper on Jewish immigration into Palestine." He urged Churchill to let him have his "ideas on the settlement of the Palestine Problem" so that they could discuss it "in concrete terms" at a later but "not too distant date." The days of British control of policy on Palestine were clearly over.

Attlee replied briefly on 31 July. He would give "early and careful consideration" to Truman's memorandum, and was sure that Truman understood that he could not give him "any statement on policy until we have had time to consider the matter."

In the meantime the two leaders had met at the Potsdam Conference, which opened on 17 July and continued until 2 August. Here the Allied Powers discussed German disarmament, occupation, war crimes trials, and the unconditional surrender of Japan. It was at Potsdam that Truman informed Stalin about the U.S. possession of a "very powerful bomb." But amid these concerns Truman also found time to tell Attlee that "the American people as a whole firmly believe that immigration into Palestine should not be closed."

On 31 August Truman, having authorized the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki earlier in the month, returned to the charge on Palestine. He wrote to Attlee to bring to his attention a report by Earl G. Harrison, dean of the University of Pennsylvania law school, whom he had earlier sent (under pressure from American Jewish leaders) to investigate the condition of Jewish refugees among displaced persons in Europe. Harrison had recommended the granting of 100,000 immigration certificates to Palestine for the Jewish refugees. Endorsing Harrison's recommendation, Truman emphasized that the "main

solution appears to lie in the quick evacuation of as many as possible of the non-repatriable Jews, who wish it, to Palestine.”

Attlee’s reply came on 16 September. He pointed out that in Palestine “we have the Arabs to consider as well as the Jews and there have been solemn undertakings, I understand, given by your predecessor [Roosevelt], yourself, and by Mr. Churchill that before we come to a final decision . . . there would be consultation with the Arabs.” He noted that the Jews were not using the immigration certifications available to them but were insisting “upon the complete repudiation of the White Paper and the immediate granting of 100,000 certificates quite regardless of the effect on the situation in the Middle East.” While he sympathized with the views of Mr. Harrison, the prime minister continued, the latter’s suggestion “raises very far reaching implications.” The matter of the refugees was under “urgent examination” with a view to the formulation of a long-term policy to be referred to the United Nations.

The dynamics of Anglo-American relations at this time cannot be understood without reference to Britain’s dire postwar economic condition. From August 1939 to June 1945 Britain had increased her debt to other countries from £476 million to £3.355 billion.²⁶ Thanks to the U.S. Lend-Lease Act of March 1941, which had provided Britain with \$7 billion in military credit,²⁷ Britain “was not burdened with a further load of war debt to the U.S.”²⁸ But on 21 August 1945, on the eve of Truman’s latest *démarche* concerning Jewish immigration to Palestine, the American president had announced out of the blue the immediate end of lend-lease. According to Alan Bullock, the British historian and biographer of Ernest Bevin, this “fell on Whitehall like a V2 without warning,” while the renowned British economist Lord Keynes described it as “without exaggeration a financial Dunkirk.”²⁹ Britain’s economic woes were such that she “could only hope to buy what she needed to keep her people fed and employed if the U.S. could come to her aid again with a loan of at least 1,500 million pounds.”³⁰ As early as October 1944, the British ambassador to Washington had warned that the “Zionist campaign . . . could affect the outcome on the lend-lease settlement and a dollar loan.”³¹ It is interesting to note that some months prior to the U.S. action ending lend-lease, on 27 January and 2 February 1945, a resolution had been introduced into the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, which called upon the United States “to take appropriate measures to the end that the doors of Palestine shall be opened for the free entry of Jews into that country and that there shall be full opportunity for colonization so that the Jewish people may ultimately reconstitute Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish Commonwealth.” The resolution did not pass, but it is significant that its wording was a *verbatim* replication of the resolutions of the 1942 Biltmore Conference sired by Ben-Gurion.

On 25 October 1945, Attlee sent a brief note to Truman emphasizing that the problem of Palestine and “of helping the Jews of Europe were not necessarily

With the formation of the Anglo-American Committee, Britain transformed its mandate into a condominium, with the United States as senior partner.

the same.” Nonetheless, he advised the president that he would “very shortly” put a specific proposal to him. Three weeks later, the proposal was unveiled. On 13 November 1945, Ernest Bevin, the British foreign secretary, announced in the House of Commons the formation of the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry “under a rotating chairmanship to examine the question of European Jewry and to make a further review of the Palestine Problem in light of the examination.”³² With this, Britain transformed its mandate into a condominium, with the United States as the senior partner.

LOCAL PALESTINIAN POLITICS AND THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMITTEE

As could be expected, the arrangement reached between Nuri Pasha and Musa Alami on the Arab Offices and Development Society generated mounting Palestinian resistance. To understand the repercussions it is necessary to view it within the context of intra-Palestinian politics. By the end of the 1936–39 Great Rebellion, a deep unprecedented fissure in Palestinian society had become apparent. This was rooted in the pre-Rebellion division into two camps: the *majlisiyyun* supporting Haj Amin, and the *mu'aridun*, led by Raghīb Bey Nashashabi, opposing him. What the Rebellion, particularly its second phase in the wake of the Peel partition recommendations, had added was the sanguinary dimension. Scores of opposition leaders were killed, which in a society based on family and clan loyalties sent shock waves throughout the country. The perpetrators were mostly guerillas fighting the British under the command of Haj Amin from his exile in Lebanon. The *mu'aridun* put the blame directly on Haj Amin personally. There is little doubt that Haj Amin condoned the elimination of collaborators, informers, and *simsars* (land brokers) involved in sales to Jews, to the resounding approval of public opinion. But the extent of his involvement in the elimination of political opponents—simply for being *mu'aridun*—remains ambiguous to this day.

Despite the division in the country, Haj Amin retained his status as the paramount Palestinian leader to the end of the Mandate, just as *al-bizb al-'arabi* led by his cousin Jamal remained the most popular and best organized political party. Indeed, the fact that both Haj Amin and Jamal were still in forced exile by the British only enhanced their nationalist credentials and allure. So strong was the position of the *majlisiyyun* (including *al-bizb al-'arabi*) that all attempts at resumed political organization by others during the war years failed. Even when the leaders of the other parties—the Istiqlal, Reform, Defense, National Bloc, Youth Congress³³ (of which only the Defense party belonged to the *mu'aridun*)—got together, they could not prevail in the face of opposition from the *majlisiyyun*. These latter stoutly maintained that any political organization in the absence of the “country’s leaders” (Haj Amin and Jamal) was an act of disloyalty that only furthered the British agenda against the two absentees. This of course was deeply resented by the other party leaders. In retrospect, the unanimous choice of Musa Alami as the Palestinian representative to the Alexandria Conference seems an act of untypical statesmanship.

But the honeymoon between Musa and his Palestinian colleagues was not to last.

On 22 March 1945, the Arab League Charter was signed on the basis of the discussions at the Alexandria Conference, and in November Britain announced the formation of the Anglo-American Committee. It was time for the Palestinians to get their act together. But even at this late date it took the intervention of Jamil Bey Mardam Bey, the Syrian prime minister, acting on behalf of the Arab League, for any progress to be made. Jamil Bey traveled to Jerusalem where he bullied and coaxed the Palestinian leaders into establishing a united “front” in the form of a new AHC to replace the one disbanded by the British in 1937. His formula was a committee of twelve members: five for *al-bizb al-‘arabi*; one each for the five parties—Defense (Nashashibi), Reform (Khalidi), National Bloc (Salah), Youth Congress (Ghossein), and Istiqlal (‘Abd al-Hadi); and two independents, Musa Alami and Ahmad Hilmi Pasha. There was to be no chairman in deference to the absent leaders, but the acting chairman he put in place was a second-tier member of the Husayni family who would take precedence over his more senior colleagues. As for the Palestinian representation at the upcoming meeting of the Arab League Council, it was to consist of Musa, Ghussein, and someone from *al-bizb al-‘arabi*.³⁴ Only by such concessions to the *majlisiyyun* could Jamil Bey win their approval of the new AHC, but it came with a price—the frustration and disgust of everyone else.

Despite his apparently diminished representative status, Musa at the Arab League Council in late November 1945 elaborated on his two major projects, the Arab Offices and the Development Society. His advocacy of the Development Society did not endear him to Ahmad Hilmi Pasha, his independent colleague in the recently reconstituted AHC, who had been involved (unsuccessfully) since 1932 in launching a similar project.³⁵ To add yet another wrinkle, Hilmi Pasha had broken with his son-in-law and erstwhile partner in the ownership of the Arab Bank, Abdul Hamid Shoman, a major supporter of *al-bizb al-‘arabi*, and had established a rival bank, the National Bank (*Bank al-Ummah*). Thus the two major Palestinian financial institutions, the Arab Bank and the National Bank, became aligned with rival political groups, the former with the *majlisiyyun* (including *bizb al-‘arabi*) and the latter with the leaders of the other parties (Reform, Istiqlal, National Bloc, Youth Congress) plus the *mu‘aridun* (including Nashashibi’s Defense party). This served only to deepen the polarization within the Palestinian camp. In this political panorama, Musa the “independent” was identified with the *majlisiyyun* and *bizb al-‘arabi*, while Hilmi Pasha, the other “independent,” was identified with the opposition. At the same time, Musa’s stance at the Arab League had the full support of Hashemite Iraq and Transjordan but was increasingly looked askance upon by the non-Hashemites and by the Arab League Secretariat under ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Azzam Pasha. The result was the refusal of the Arab League members to fulfill their financial obligations with regard to Musa’s two schemes.³⁶ Musa had to scrap his Moscow and Paris offices.³⁷ (The head of the Paris office, before it closed, was Charles Helou, future president of Lebanon.)

The Development Society and Arab Offices became central bones of contention in the AHC as newly reconstituted by Mardam Bey. The party leaders and the *mu'aridun* plausibly maintained that schemes of such importance should be under the collective supervision of the committee, while Musa insisted that Iraq had entrusted them to him personally. Musa's most outspoken critic became Hussein Fakhri Khalidi, until recently a principal ally. Earlier, Hussein Fakhri had instantly reacted to Bevin's announcement of the formation of the Anglo-American Committee, warning presciently about Zionist influence in the United States and the watering down of Britain's responsibilities under the White Paper through her association with the United States.³⁸ In articles in the daily *Filastin*, he castigated Musa, declaring him to be accountable to the parties since he had been chosen by them. Although Musa claimed to be briefing the parties about the Development Society and Arab Office schemes, Hussein Fakhri charged, he was doing nothing of the sort. The Development Society scheme was unsound in its details and based on inadequate study and statistics, he continued, and the Arab Office branches in the Western capitals were going to deal with issues of high policy and should not operate without proper national control. And so on.³⁹ It did not help that Musa, while charming when he wanted to be, was secretive, aloof, proud, irascible, quick to take umbrage, and prone to dejectedness. On the other hand, Khalidi's stated grounds for opposition were not necessarily the only ones. He was clearly angered by Musa's sudden refusal to consult or apprise him and may also have envied the great accretion of Musa's power and influence via Iraq.

In early February 1946 the British released Jamal Husayni from detention and allowed him back in Palestine. The timing was not coincidental. The Anglo-American Committee had already assembled and held meetings in Washington, DC (4-18 January), and London (25 January-4 February), and divided into subcommittees in Europe (5-27 February). It was supposed to fly to Cairo on 28 February for meetings with the Arab League and to arrive in Jerusalem on 6 March. Hussein Fakhri's call for a boycott resonated.

But Musa strongly believed in the absolute necessity of a powerful presentation of the Palestinian case to the committee. He was haunted by the poor performance of the Palestinians before the Peel Commission in 1936, when the AHC had not decided to appear until the last moment and then was ill prepared. He was determined to avoid a repeat performance and had already asked Albert to start work on the Palestinian testimony. Some party leaders—Nashashibi (Defense) and 'Abd al-Hadi (Istiqlal)⁴⁰—backed him on this issue, but he needed a decision by the AHC as a whole on the principle of appearing before the Anglo-American Committee. And this decision the AHC was too fractured to make. In this race against time, the British release of Jamal, Musa's admirer, brother-in-law, and neighbor (they lived on two separate floors of a large, two-story stone house built by Musa's father close by the Notre Dame in Jerusalem) came in handy.

Meanwhile Jamal, who had entered Palestine from Lebanon by the coastal road, was received like a Roman emperor returning victorious from a major

campaign in one continuous triumphal procession through village and town until he reached Jerusalem. The tens of thousands who turned out to greet him were in reality paying tribute to the person whom he was seen to represent: the still exiled Haj Amin. But Jamal can be forgiven for assuming that the acclaim was meant for him personally. Never known for excessive modesty, this was heady wine indeed.

On the eve of the Anglo-American Committee's arrival in Jerusalem, the AHC met, with Jamal present, in extraordinary session to discuss whether or not to appear before it. Khalidi inexplicably did not reaffirm his opposition, but Hilmi Pasha spoke out against it (to spite Musa?). Nevertheless, the AHC decided in favor of testifying before the committee.⁴¹

Jamal's next task was the reconstitution of the AHC. This he carried out with characteristic high-handedness, buoyed by the conviction that he had received an unconditional mandate by popular acclamation. On 25 March, he announced the formation of a new AHC, with himself in the chair. The new committee retained the five *bizb al-'arabi* members from Mardam Bey's committee, plus seven "independents" friendly to the *bizb*. Jamal's rationale was that the old AHC was fragmented and paralyzed, unable to act when action was most needed. Which was true enough. More questionable was his assertion that *bizb al-'arabi* enjoyed the support of 99 percent of Palestinians, though he was willing to concede that the percentage could be as low as 95.⁴² The other party leaders promptly formed the Higher Arab Front. It included all the excluded members of the dissolved committee—Hilmi Pasha and the five party leaders 'Abd al-Hadi (Istiqlal), Khalidi (Reform), Salah (National Bloc), Ghussein (Youth Congress), and Nashashibi (Defense)—plus, for good measure, Suleiman Bey Tukan, the leader of the *mu'aridun* in Nablus. As for Musa, he had wisely resigned from the AHC before its reconstitution by Jamal, who in any case now entirely covered his rear and flanks and who firmly approved of his sole management of the two schemes under the terms of the agreement with Iraq.

Meanwhile, the Anglo-American Committee had arrived in Palestine on 6 March 1946. Two days later, on 8 March, Musa, armed with the AHC's decision accepting the principle of appearing before the committee, called for a general meeting ostensibly to agree on coordinating the Arab testimonies but in fact basically a PR exercise. Musa arrived with an entourage including three *bizb al-'arabi* members of the AHC, Albert Hourani, and Ahmad Shuqayri, a very ambitious rising lawyer who had been appointed director of the Arab Office. (He had also been appointed to the re-constituted AHC by Jamal.) There was also an assortment of Palestinian public figures including the mayor of Jaffa, the Greek Catholic bishop of Palestine, and my father, Ahmad Samih al-Khalidi.⁴³ The most prominent non-Palestinian Arab attendees were the consuls of Turkey, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq.⁴⁴

The meetings in Jerusalem were held at the YMCA building in a medium-sized room with a capacity of perhaps a hundred people. Attendance by the public was strictly controlled. The Zionist leaders who appeared before the full committee included Chaim Weizmann, David Ben-Gurion, Moshe Sharett,

Golda Meir, Judah Magnes, and the two chief rabbis. Four Palestinians appeared before the full committee: Jamal Husayni and 'Awni 'Abd al-Hadi, representing the AHC and the Arab Higher Front respectively, and Ahmad Shuqayri and Albert Hourani representing the Arab Office. Albert was the last Arab to appear before the committee.

The Anglo-American Committee was composed of twelve members, six Americans and six Brits. For the United Kingdom, these were Justice John E. Singleton (co-chair); Major Reginald Manningham-Buller, Conservative MP; W. F. Crick, advisor to Midland Bank; R. H. S. Crossman, Labor MP; Sir Frederick Legget, deputy secretary in the Labor Ministry; and Lord Morrison, Labor peer. Representing the United States were Justice Joseph C. Hutcheson (co-chair); Dr. Frank Aydlot, director of Princeton's Institute of Advanced Studies; Frank W. Buxton, editor of the *Boston Herald*; Bartley C. Crum, a San Francisco lawyer; J. G. McDonald, the League of Nations high commissioner for refugees; and William Philips, diplomat.⁴⁵ These were supported by a staff of twenty-two research assistants and secretaries, equally drawn from the two countries.⁴⁶ At least five of its members—Crum, McDonald, Buxton, Crossman, and Morrison—had Zionist sympathies, to say the least. Crum had been recommended by David Niles, a Zionist and an assistant on minority affairs at the White House. McDonald was a "good friend" of Zionist leader Rabbi Stephen Wise. Buxton had been recommended to Secretary of State James Byrnes by Felix Frankfurter, the Zionist associate justice of the Supreme Court.⁴⁷

The Anglo-American Committee remained in Palestine until 28 March 1945. During that period, certain of its members visited Damascus, Beirut, Baghdad, Riyadh, and Amman. They retired to Lausanne, Switzerland, to write their report, which was signed on 20 April.

Bevin had promised adoption of the report if it were unanimous. At first Crum, McDonald, and Crossman held out for partition and pressed for the immediate admission of 100,000 Jews into Palestine. Others favored a recommendation that Palestine should be neither a Jewish nor an Arab state pending placing the country under a UN trusteeship. Singleton adamantly linked the recommendation of the 100,000 immigration certificates to the disbandment of the Haganah. The deadlock evolved into a horse-trading following a telegram from Truman (drafted by Niles) to Hutcheson urging him to produce a report "from the entire (sic) commission" recommending "an affirmative program to relieve untold suffering and misery." In exchange for the committee's not recommending an Arab or a Jewish state and for strong criticism (but not disbandment) of the Haganah, the Brits yielded on the 100,000 certificates.⁴⁸ The winners were Truman and Ben-Gurion. The White Paper was trashed.

MY TENURE AT THE ARAB OFFICE IN JERUSALEM, 1945–46

A footnote to all this is my joining the Arab Office at this time. In the early autumn of 1945, at the height of his clash with my uncle Hussein Fakhri, Musa invited me to his house. I had just completed my twentieth year and

married, having obtained my London University degree the previous year. Up until then, I had been a history teacher at the Ummah College (a secondary school) run by the redoubtable educator Shukri Harami, at a salary of 17 pounds per month.

Musa received me in his exquisitely furnished home, where I shook hands with Saadiyyah, his lissome wife. Musa was impressive and disarming, with his suave manner and large sad eyes. He stressed the importance of a persuasive and documented presentation of the Palestine case to the West. He was going to start by establishing an office here in Jerusalem. He wanted to make use of educated young Arabs. Shuqayri would be the director of the office and Albert was in charge of research and documentation. Albert would be my boss and would tell me what my responsibilities were. He needed help because we were starting from scratch. We still had to find an office, build up a library and archives, and establish contact with representatives of the Western media. Would I be willing to serve? I was overwhelmed and flattered, and thanked him for thinking of me. I said that I needed a little time to think things over. He said he understood and hoped to hear from me soon.

I was very much in favor of accepting the offer because I truly believed in the Arab Office's mission and had great admiration for Albert. But at the same time, I was well aware that, locked as he was in confrontation with Hussein Fakhri, Musa could mark my recruitment as a notch of sorts, particularly as my father was close to Hussein Fakhri. For this reason I felt I had to check with my family, at least pro forma.

Rasha, my bride, was all in favor. My father listened to my account of the meeting with Musa and said that the decision was mine. I next called on Hussein Fakhri at his office. Our relations had been unusually warm. During his exile in Mahé, the Seychelles Islands (1937-38), we had had a running correspondence. My job was to keep him regularly supplied with cowboy novels, his favorite reading staple, which I purchased at the Boulos Said bookshop (owned by Edward's uncle) near Jaffa Gate with a subsidy from my father. I remember a postcard that Hussein Fakhri sent me in which he reported his unvarying daily diet: bananas—fresh, cooked, baked, and fried. When I went to see him, he explained his objections to the way Musa was running the Arab Office. He did not think my joining him was such a good idea but did not specifically veto it. The following day I phoned Musa to say that I accepted the job.

I was immediately asked to help in finding a suitable building to rent. Others were also assigned to this task, and presently a simple two-story medium sized stone villa with a small garden was found. It was located in the Dayr Abu Tur quarter on the left side of the main road to Bethlehem, about 300 yards south of the railway station just before the fork where a side road leading to Government House, the High Commissioner's Residence on the Hill of Evil Counsel, passed by the Abu Tur monastery, the Talavera Barracks (the site later chosen for the American embassy to Israel), the golf course, the Arab College, and (my next door neighbor) Mrs. Ben Zvi's Girls' Agricultural School (whose residents wore somewhat exiguous blue shorts). In the previous decade, I had traveled this

route back and forth countless times on foot, bicycle, school bus, taxi, private car, and motorbike (both piggyback and sidecar).

The Arab Office, we were told, would be on the ground floor of the villa, with the Development Society and Musa Bey's office on the floor above. Shuqayri, with his incipient paunch and resonant Ciceronian Arabic diction, was also on that floor. Early on, a wiry, soft-spoken, quietly efficient blond Hebronite with a

The office manager was Rubi Khatib, later the last mayor of East Jerusalem, brusquely dismissed in June 1967 by an Israeli order scribbled on a paper napkin.

pock-marked face appeared on the scene to take charge as office manager. This was Ruhi Khatib, later the last mayor of East Jerusalem, brusquely dismissed in June 1967 by an Israeli order scribbled on a paper napkin.⁴⁹ In addition to Shuqayri, Albert, Ruhi, and myself, the full-time Arab Office staff comprised Nasr al-Din Nashashibi (Nasri for short), Burhan Dajani, Wadi' Tarazi, and Abdul Hamid Yasin. Nasri, a voluble wag and upcoming Arabic journalist, and Burhan, a short, cerebral, and supremely

self-assured graduate in economics from the AUB, were only a little older than myself, the rest considerably so. Tarazi was a tall affable Greek Orthodox headmaster from Gaza, and Yasin, somewhat self-important, had been town clerk in the Jaffa municipality. Burhan and I were in effect Albert's assistants. I never found out what Tarazi and Yasin did, but Nasri did a daily summary of the Arabic press that was sent to Musa, Shuqayri, and others. Our monthly salaries and expenses were paid in cash by Ruhi. As I recall, mine was about £40.

Albert briefed Burhan and me on the Office's testimony to the Anglo-American Committee. There would be three parts: a lengthy (about 100 foolscap pages) overview of the Palestine problem, including a critique of solutions proffered or contemplated by the British and the Zionists, as well as an exposition of the Arab solution and its rationale. The text would be written by Musa (i.e., by Albert under Musa's supervision and review).⁵⁰ The second part would consist of some thirty appendices (of 2,000–3,000 words each) elaborating on specific aspects of the Palestine problem to be designated by Albert. Some of these would be done by Burhan, some by me, and the rest by outside specialists (including Yusuf Sayigh and Charles Issawi, both writing on economic subjects.) Musa and Albert would review all appendices.⁵¹ The third part would be oral testimony by an office spokesperson to be chosen later. In addition to writing the assigned appendices, I was to build up the office's library (which I did, hauling to the office taxi loads of English books purchased from Jewish bookshops) and to talk to representatives of the Western news media (which meshed in very nicely with my beat at the King David Hotel bar).

Access to the top floor, where Shuqayri also had his office, was through the lobby of our floor. This enabled us to closely monitor all comings and goings. When in town Musa came to his office daily, and on many occasions was closeted with Albert for hours. Musa received a constant stream of visitors. I particularly remember the visits by the slim arched figure of Sami Taha, the Haifa labor leader, because he was assassinated the year after, allegedly by supporters of Haj Amin.

Two new denizens of our premises aroused special curiosity. One was a bespectacled gentleman in his fifties with a long stern face elongated by a perpetual tarbush. This was Tawfic Pasha Abul Huda (no relation to Luli), a former prime minister of Transjordan, whom Musa had appointed as director of the Development Society. Tawfic Pasha was again prime minister of Transjordan, during the 1948 war, and committed suicide some time later. The other newcomer was a handsome swarthy young man in his mid-twenties of ramrod posture with a crew cut, wearing a British army uniform with the rank of captain. This was Wasfi Tall, who had volunteered in the British army and was not yet demobilized. Wasfi, who was later to be prime minister of Jordan a number of times, most notably during September 1970, seemed to act as Musa's aide-de-camp, carrying his briefcase and opening the car door for him. He would often come to our floor to regale us with his military and other exploits. Some of these were so tall that they earned him the sobriquet of Baron Münchhausen. But the Baron redeemed himself. We were so concentrated on completing the written testimony, which by now had risen to a manuscript about two inches high, that no one had given much thought to the logistics of its printing and distribution. The printing could not be done outside for security reasons. Who was to do it on site? This was no simple matter in the days before Xerox machines and paper sorters. How many copies were to be made? How to compile them? How to ensure the proper pagination of each set? Just as we were beginning to panic, with only a few days left, the Baron calmly announced that he would take care of things. And so he did. Procuring loads of stationery and hauling the stencil machine upstairs, he laid the office tables end to end around the large hall. Working virtually non-stop for two days and nights running, he stacked the testimony papers in one hundred neat sets, with some 24 hours to spare. Within a year he had run away with Saadiyah, Musa's wife, to whom he remained married until his assassination in Cairo by Palestinians in 1971 in vengeance for Black September.

* * *

In May, soon after his testimony before the Anglo-American Committee, Albert left Jerusalem for London to head the Arab Office there. A year later, in June 1947, he resigned, a disappointed man. The cause was partly his growing frustration at the continuing deterioration of the Palestinian situation under the relentless pressure on London by Truman, and partly the escalation of tension between Musa and his Palestinian opponents. Haj Amin, soon after his return to the Middle East in April 1946, immediately took control of the AHC and peremptorily demanded that Musa put the Arab Office and the Development Society under the AHC's authority and hand over their funds.⁵² When Musa refused, the AHC, in coordination with the Arab League, opened parallel offices in London and New York, designating them as the sole representatives of the Palestinians.⁵³ In December 1947, after the UN partition resolution, the then prime minister of Iraq, Saleh Jaber, informed Musa that his government would

“pay their expenses only until the end of the current week.”⁵⁴ Within months, Musa had closed the Washington office, which in the meantime had been raided at Zionist instigation by the FBI.⁵⁵ The London office took a little longer to peter out.⁵⁶ Immediately after the Palestine war, Musa wrote a devastating exercise in Arab self-criticism, *Ibrat Filastin* (“The Moral of Palestine”), based on the bitter experience of a lifetime in Palestinian and Arab politics.⁵⁷

In the meantime, Albert had been encouraged by Hamilton Gibb to return to Oxford, which he did early in 1948 as research fellow at Magdalene College. Later that year our paths recrossed, when I went up to Oxford (University College) to work on my thesis on eighteenth century Syro-Palestinian Sufism under Gibb. Albert’s life at Oxford culminated in his magisterial *A History of the Arab Peoples*. I am convinced that Musa Bey personified for Albert the Arab “notable.”

As a final footnote, it was at the Arab Office in Jerusalem that the Institute for Palestine Studies had its roots in 1961–63. Burhan Dajani and I were by then both teaching at the AUB, where Dr. Constantine Zurayk had become our colleague. When the three of us established the Institute in 1963, Musa’s example was before us. While determined not to repeat his mistakes in terms of dependency, we embraced his vision.

NOTES

1. ‘Awni ‘Abd al-Hadi, *Mudbakkirat ‘Awni ‘Abd al-Hadi* [Memoirs of Awni Abd al-Hadi], edited by Khayriya Qasimiya (Beirut: Markaz dirasat al-wahda al-‘arabiya, 2002), pp. 262 ff.

2. Geoffrey Furlonge, *Palestine Is My Country: The Story of Musa Alami* (London: John Murray, 1969), p. 41.

3. Furlonge, *Palestine Is My Country*, pp. 72, 86.

4. Furlonge, *Palestine Is My Country*, p. 99.

5. Walid Khalidi, *Before Their Diaspora: A Photographic History of the Palestinians, 1876–1948* (Washington: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1991), p. 205.

6. Furlonge, *Palestine Is My Country*, pp. 99–100.

7. Furlonge, *Palestine Is My Country*, p. 102.

8. Shabtai Teveth, *Ben-Gurion and the Palestinian Arabs: From Peace to War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 132–34, 137–41, 163.

9. Albert Hourani, “Musa Alami and the Palestine Problem, 1939–1949” in *Studia Palaestina: Studies in Honor of Constantine K. Zurayk*, edited by Hisham

Nashabe (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1988), pp. 23 ff.

10. Khalidi, *Before Their Diaspora*, pp. 204–206.

11. Furlonge, *Palestine Is My Country*, p. 102.

12. Hourani, “Musa Alami and the Palestine Problem,” p. 30.

13. Furlonge, *Palestine Is My Country*, p. 128.

14. Hourani, “Musa Alami and the Palestine Problem,” pp. 31 ff.

15. George Kirk, *The Middle East in the War* (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 67.

16. Kirk, *The Middle East in the War*, p. 335.

17. Kirk, *The Middle East in the War*, p. 336.

18. See Hourani, “Musa Alami and the Palestine Problem,” p. 36, for the impression made on “an unofficial observer,” almost certainly Hourani himself.

19. For the text of Musa’s speech in Arabic, see Bayan Nuwayhid al-Hout, *Qiyadat wal-mu’assasat al-siyasiya fi filastin, 1917–1948* [Political Leadership and Institutions in Palestine, 1917–1948]

(Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1981), pp. 809 ff.

20. See Walid Khalidi, *From Haven to Conquest: Readings in Zionism and the Palestine Problem until 1948*

(Washington: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1987), pp. 303 ff.

21. Furlonge, *Palestine Is My Country*, p. 137.

22. Furlonge, *Palestine Is My Country*, p. 137.

23. Muhammad 'Izzat Darwaza, *Mudbakkirat 1305-1404/1887-1984* [Memoirs 1305-1404/1887-1984] (Beirut: Dar al-gharb al-Islami, 1993), vol. 1, p. 761.

24. Ben-Gurion had decided to substitute American for British sponsorship of Zionism as early as 1939. See Khalidi, *From Haven to Conquest*, pp. 481 ff.

25. For the following quotes from the Truman-Attlee exchanges, see Khalidi, *From Haven to Conquest*, pp. 557 ff, and Francis Williams, *A Prime Minister Remembers: The War and Post-War Memoirs of the Right Honourable Earl Attlee* (London: Heinemann, 1961), pp. 181-200.

26. Allan Bullock, *Ernest Bevin* (New York and London: WW Norton & Co., 1983), p. 50.

27. *The World Almanac and Book of Facts 2003* (New York: World Almanac, 2003), p. 533.

28. Bullock, *Ernest Bevin*, p. 50.

29. Bullock, *Ernest Bevin*, p. 50.

30. Bullock, *Ernest Bevin*, p. 50.

31. Bullock, *Ernest Bevin*, p. 174.

32. *A Survey of Palestine*

(Washington: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1991), vol. 1, p. 82.

33. The following leaders were allowed back: 'Awni 'Abd al-Hadi (Istiqlal), Dr. Hussein Fakhri Khalidi (Reform), Ya'cob Ghussein (Youth Congress), and 'Abd al-Latif Salah (National Bloc). Also allowed back was Ahmad Hilmi Pasha—an independent. Raghieb Nashashibi (Defense) and leader of the *mu'aridun* was not a persona non grata to the British.

34. *A Survey of Palestine*, vol. 2, p. 952.

35. Hout, *Qiyadat wal-mu'assasat*, pp. 728-30.

36. Furlonge, *Palestine Is My Country*, pp. 137 ff.

37. Furlonge, *Palestine Is My Country*, pp. 137 ff.

38. Hout, *Qiyadat wal-mu'assasat*, p. 551.

39. Darwaza, *Mudbakkirat*, vol. 5, pp. 455, 530.

40. 'Abd al-Hadi, *Mudbakkirat*, pp. 289 ff.

41. 'Abd al-Hadi, *Mudbakkirat*, p. 286.

42. Darwaza, *Mudbakkirat*, vol. 5, p. 565; *Palestinian Encyclopedia* II (Arabic), p. 22; Hout, *Qiyadat wal-mu'assasat*, p. 899.

43. 'Abd al-Hadi, *Mudbakkirat*, p. 286.

44. 'Abd al-Hadi, *Mudbakkirat*, p. 286.

45. Martin Jones, *Failure in Palestine: British and U.S. Policy after the Second World War* (London and New York: Mansell Publishing, 1986), p. 71.

46. *Report of the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry Regarding the Problems of European Jewry and Palestine*, Command 6808 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1946), p. 80.

47. Jones, *Failure in Palestine*, p. 71.

48. Jones, *Failure in Palestine*, pp. 78 ff.

49. Meron Benvenisti, *Jerusalem, A Torn City* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1976), p. 105.

50. The full text of this overview was published, with no mention of authorship, as *The Future of Palestine*, prepared by the Arab Office, London (Geneva, August 1947). It was reprinted with the same title, but with a preface by Musa Alami, by Hermon Press in Beirut in 1970.

51. Three of these appendices, including one by me ("Promises and Undertakings in Regard to Palestine"), again with no mention of authorship, were published in *The Future of Palestine*.

52. Darwaza, *Mudbakkirat*, vol. 1, p. 761.

53. Furlonge, *Palestine Is My Country*, p. 151.

54. Furlonge, *Palestine Is My Country*, p. 151.

55. Furlonge, *Palestine Is My Country*, pp. 145, 151.

56. Furlonge, *Palestine Is My Country*, pp. 145, 151.

57. Translated into English by Cecil Hourani as "The Lesson of Palestine" in *Middle East Journal* 3, no. 4 (October 1949), pp. 373-405.