



## HISTORICAL DOCUMENT

### THE CASE AGAINST A JEWISH STATE IN PALESTINE: ALBERT HOURANI'S STATEMENT TO THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMITTEE OF ENQUIRY OF 1946

*Albert Hourani (1915–1993), associated for over thirty years with Oxford University (Magdalene College, St. Antony's College), was one of the leading historians of the Middle East in the postwar period and the author of many books, including Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, Europe and the Middle East, and A History of the Arab Peoples. Before embarking on his Oxford career, Hourani was director of research at the Arab Office in Jerusalem, and in 1946 was one of four Arabs (the others being Jamal Husayni, 'Awni 'Abd al-Hadi, and Ahmad Shukayri) to testify before the full committee of the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry called upon to review the Palestine Problem in the light of Jewish refugee situation in Europe. For a detailed background of the politics—local, regional, and international—leading up to the testimony, see Walid Khalidi's "On Albert Hourani, the Arab Office, and the Anglo-American Committee of 1946" in this issue. What follows is the full transcript of Hourani's oral testimony—the last to be presented for the Arab side—as issued in the proceedings "Public Hearings before the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry, Jerusalem (Palestine), 25 March 1946" (IPS Archives).*

MR. CHAIRMAN, I THINK it is best to speak as shortly as is consistent with the adequate expression of my most important ideas, and I shall therefore not go over in detail the grounds which have already been covered in our written evidence. I shall use my time in order to reply to certain questions which have been raised in the course of your inquiry and to deal with certain considerations which may be present in your minds. But before this, speaking as a member of the Arab Office—and I believe as the last witness who will appear on the Arab side—I think it is right to emphasize, without elaborating what needs no further elaboration, the unalterable opposition of the Arab nation to the attempt to impose a Jewish State upon it. This opposition is based upon the unwavering conviction of unshakeable rights and a conviction of the injustice of forcing a long-settled population to accept immigrants without its consent being asked and against its known and expressed will; the injustice of turning a majority into a minority in its own country; the injustice of withholding self-government until the Zionists are in the majority and able to profit by it.

The Arab opposition is based also upon the situation of the dangers of Zionism which threaten to distort the whole natural development of Arab peace—social, economic, political, and intellectual—and threatens also, if not to dominate the Arab world, at least to disturb its life for generations to come.

The Arab people, speaking through its responsible leaders, has again and again emphasized that the only just and practicable solution for the problem of Palestine lies in the constitution of Palestine, with the least possible delay, into a self-governing state, with its Arab majority, but with full rights for the Jewish citizens of Palestine. A state which should enter the United Nations organization and the Arab League on a level of equality with other Arab states; a state in which questions of general concern, like immigration, should be decided by the ordinary democratic procedure in accordance with the will of the majority.

I don't intend, as I said, to go into detail about the Arab objections to Zionism or the Arab proposals for the solution of the problem, since they have been expressed in intolerable length in the written evidence we have placed before you. But I wish to make one remark. Even those who reject the Arab proposals cannot deny them one merit: they are at least proposals for a final and definite solution of the problem.

The Zionist proposals also have an appearance of finality, although we believe they are impossible of application. And if the attempt were made to carry them into practice, it would involve a terrible injustice and could only be carried out at the expense of dreadful repressions and disorders, with the risk of bringing down in ruins the whole political structure of the Middle East.

It has been made clear to the Committee that what the Zionists want is a state and nothing else. I make reference to Mr. Ben-Gurion's answer when he was asked whether he would save the lives of 100,000 German Jews at the cost of giving up his ideal of a Jewish State, and he said no.

The alternatives, it seems to me, are perfectly clear: either one must attempt to establish a Jewish State with all the risk involved, or else one must attempt to put into practice the Arab proposals. Nevertheless, it may still be thought possible to escape between the horns of the dilemma and to find some intermediate solution for the problem. All these intermediate solutions, I believe, are illusory, but they should be examined, and I propose to examine, as briefly as I can, three of them: The first, partition; the second, Doctor Magnes's proposal for the establishment of a binational state; third, the proposal which has not crystallized, but which I feel is in the air: that a certain number of immigrants, let us say 100,000, shall be brought in with the least possible delay and a certain amount of self-government should be established, also without much delay, but that the final solution of the problem should be postponed until the future.

First, the idea of partition. It isn't necessary for me to emphasize that the fundamental Arab objection to this is one of principle. If they object to a Jewish State on the grounds of principle in the whole of Palestine, they cannot object to it [in part] and they cannot accept it in part. If they accept it in principle in part, they cannot oppose it in principle in the whole. The size and the extent of the Jewish State is irrelevant to the question of principle.

Apart from that, there are grave practical difficulties in the way of partition (difficulties which were dealt with finally in the report of the Woodhead Commission): difficulties in regard to administration, to finance, to trade. Difficulties of having an Arab State which would be confined mainly to the hill country, which is poor and where there is already a problem of rural overpopulation. And above all, the difficulty of whatever frontiers you attempt to draw for a Jewish State, there would still be a very considerable Arab minority in there, and this Arab minority could not be transferred forcibly because you can't transfer peasants forcibly. And equally, it [the minority] could not be exchanged, because there would not be a similar Jewish minority in the Arab State for which it could be exchanged.

The Peel Commission, as you will recollect, admitted the practical difficulties of partition and said that the more they were examined, the greater they appeared. But nevertheless, it [the commission] felt that partition held out the only hope of lasting peace. This hope, I believe, is vain. I believe that even more than any other solution, partition would be opposed to the very object of peace, and that for two sets of reasons.

The first, because it is clear that the establishment of a Jewish State in part of Palestine would not satisfy the great majority of Zionists that want political domination over the whole of Palestine, at least. If they obtain a state in part of Palestine, they would be tempted to use it as the first step to pressing further claims. The establishment of a Jewish State in part of Palestine would not satisfy them, but would strengthen their position and encourage them to ask for more. That, on the one hand. On the other hand, even if they accepted partition in the first place, there are factors at work which would draw them, sooner or later (and probably sooner) into inevitable conflict with the surrounding Arab world. There is a dynamic force in Zionism which, unless it is checked now, will lead them on to destruction. They will be forced into conflict with the Arab world by various factors—by the need to deal with their own Arab minority, which would not consent willingly to become the subjects of a Jewish State and which would rise and protest, and whose protest would be aided actively by surrounding Arab countries.

So that for reasons of internal security and in order to deal with their minority, the Jewish State would be brought into conflict with the surrounding countries. Then again, in certain circumstances, I can imagine [that] the pressures of population in the Jewish State would be so great [that] it would turn the thoughts of the governing body to expansion, either in order to settle Jewish immigrants outside the Jewish State, or else in order to evacuate their Arab minority. Also in certain circumstances, they might be led to expansion by the need to secure stable markets for their industrial products.

I turn secondly to Doctor Magnes's proposal for the establishment of a bi-national state. Before I examine it in detail, there is a statement which I have been asked to make. In his evidence before you, Doctor Magnes made certain statements in regard to an agreement which had been made between leading Arabs and leading Jews in 1936. This agreement, he stated, had been

signed—or he implied it had been signed—by certain leading Arabs in this country at the request of the Arab Higher Committee and its members and at the request also of the Director General of the Arab Offices. Speaking, I am certain, on behalf of all responsible Arabs in this country, I wish to deny categorically and emphatically that any such agreement was ever signed as between Doctor Magnes and anybody who might be called a leading Arab in Palestine.

I may mention that I saw Doctor Magnes before this session, and he has authorized me to say [that] the statement he made was not intended to have that implication; that, in fact, the proposals were never signed by any leading Arabs.

*Mr. Justice Singleton:* I didn't understand him as saying they were signed. I'm not quite sure, but I think he said there were suggestions and there was agreement up to a point upon the matter.

*Mr. Hourani:* I believe at one point he mentioned the signature.

*Mr. Justice Singleton:* There is no dispute between you and Doctor Magnes?

*Mr. Hourani:* No, there is no dispute; we have reached agreement. As with partition, the basic Arab objection to Doctor Magnes's proposal is one of principle, which again I needn't elaborate, and objection to the principle of further immigration which would be involved, to conceding [to the] Zionists more than they can legitimately claim to weakening the Arab character of Palestine, and to admitting the principle of the National Home.

In addition to those objections of principle, there are certain others. Doctor Magnes, in cross-examination, admitted that force might be necessary in order to bring in the hundred thousand immigrants whom he asked to be brought in immediately. This, it seems to me, destroys the moral basis of his proposals. The great advantage, as he has always urged in his proposals, is that they would make the dream possible and force unnecessary, but now he is willing to show, or, as it appears, to contemplate the use of force in the very beginning of the process, and two consequences immediately follow.

The first: It will be impossible to establish an agreement if force is used at the beginning of a proposal.

Secondly, if force is to be used at all, perhaps it should better be used in support of the policy which has more intrinsically to recommend it. Again, a binational state of the kind that Doctor Magnes suggests can only work if a certain spirit of cooperation and trust exists and if there is an underlying sense of unity to neutralize communal differences. But that spirit does not exist in Palestine. If it existed, the whole problem would have not arisen in this form and Doctor Magnes's solution would be unnecessary. Since it doesn't exist, Doctor Magnes's solution is, under present circumstances, impossible. And if it were possible—if a binational state could be established—it would lead to one of two things: Either to a complete deadlock involving perhaps the intervention of foreign powers, or else to the domination of the whole life of the state by communal considerations.

Moreover, the parity which Doctor Magnes suggests is not so complete as it appears. As we understand his proposals, the Arabs ought to make an

immediate concession of a number of immigrants, in return for the granting of self-government some time in the future. Again, self-government is not to be granted absolutely, but conditionally upon the Jews and Arabs having already found a way of peace. And again, when and if this self-government is established, it will be incomplete. The veto, as we understand Doctor Magnes's plan, is to lie in the hands of the head of state, and the constitution is not to be drafted by representatives of the people, but by the United Nations organization, and certain departments, among which I believe he mentioned the department of education, are not to be given either an Arab or Jewish head.

There is one final objection to Doctor Magnes's plan, which is perhaps the most serious of all. Doctor Magnes is a person whose integrity and sincerity none of us doubt, but it is clear to me [that] he only represents a very small section of the Jewish community in Palestine. If his scheme were carried out, it would satisfy Doctor Magnes and his supporters, perhaps, but it would not satisfy the vast majority of Zionists. Perhaps, if a binational state were established, Doctor Magnes and his group would be swept aside and the majority of Zionists would use what Doctor Magnes had obtained for them in order to press their next demands. Doctor Magnes, in other words, might be the first victim of political Zionism.

I turn now to the third set of proposals which I mentioned, a proposal which runs something like this: that the problem is very acute; there are difficulties on both sides, there is a balance of right and justice, and therefore we cannot hope for a definitive solution at the moment, but at the moment we can bring in a certain number, 100,000 immigrants; we can take the first steps to the gradual extension of administrative responsibility among the inhabitants of the country; and we can postpone the final settlement until sometime in the future, when perhaps things will be better than they are now. Here, again, the Arabs object to such a solution on grounds of principle. The number of immigrants to be brought in is irrelevant. The Arabs can never acquiesce in any immigration imposed upon them, and they cannot even begin to consider the question of immigration profitably so long as they are denied all responsibility for their own fate. The first condition about their even thinking of immigration as a possibility is that they should be given responsibility for their own national affairs.

Then again, the Arabs do not understand by what right Great Britain and the United States demand of them that they should bear the main burden of solving the problem of refugees. The guilt for creating that problem does not rest upon the shoulders of the Arabs, but on those of Europe. The Arabs have already been compelled to bear more than their fair share of solving the Jewish problem. I know so well the usual answers to this objection: the answer that it would be difficult to pass the requisite legislation through the United States Congress or the British Parliament, and the answer that the Jews would prefer to come to Palestine. But nevertheless I am not satisfied, and I do not believe that any Arab is satisfied, that Great Britain and the United States have done all that they can possibly do to solve the refugee problem at their own expense. In the past

few months I have seen references in the newspapers to various motions and resolutions introduced in the United States Congress asking that the gates of Palestine should be opened to the Jews, or that the gates of America should be shut to immigrants, but I cannot recollect seeing a serious attempt made to open the gates of America to refugees. Until the Arabs are satisfied that Great Britain and the United States have done all that they can to solve the refugee problem at their own expense, they are of the opinion that the British and American governments should refrain from urging, still more [from] coercing, the Arabs to solve the problem, or at least if they do so they should do so with the deepest possible sense of guilt and shame.

Then again, it is impossible—it is unhappily impossible—to consider the question of immigration simply on humanitarian grounds or any other grounds. The question of immigration into Palestine must be seen in its general political framework. It must always be remembered that what the Zionists are aiming at is not to solve the refugee problem for its own sake, but to secure political domination in Palestine, and that their demand for immigration is only a step towards dominating Palestine. The first essential is therefore to convince them that they can never hope to achieve their aim by pressure or in any way. The grant of immigration now, however it were justified, would encourage them to ask for more, without in any sense satisfying them.

Further, one may point out that this suggested solution is not a definitive solution; it leaves the way open for protests and pressure, for more committees and more reports, and an endless series of changes of policy. I may recall to you what happened in 1939 when the White Paper was issued, which laid down that self-government should be established after a delay of five years, but that in the interval 75,000 immigrants should be brought in. The five years have passed, and more than passed, and 75,000 and more than 75,000 immigrants have been brought in, and the country is no nearer to self-government than it was then. And now perhaps the Arabs are going to be asked to accept more immigrants, and more undertaking of eventual self-government will be given, and who knows whether after another five years they will be asked to accept more, and where will it have an end?

Again, this suggested solution would not even preserve the status quo. In Palestine, it is not enough to do nothing in order to preserve the status quo. Every day the situation grows worse; every day the tension mounts higher; every day the gap between rulers and ruled grows greater. The moral basis of the government is undermined, and this has a demoralizing effect both on rulers and ruled.

Perhaps two arguments may be put forward in favor of this type of proposal with which I am now dealing. And the first might be that even if these proposals did not solve the problem in the long run, at least they would solve it in the short run. They would help clear the camps in Europe; they would appease Jewish terrorism. They would not, so it may be claimed, arouse immediate and violent reactions among the Arabs, and that would enable the British and American governments to think about something else for the next few months.

Even if these premises were true, this would be a shortsighted argument. It would create a permanent problem for the sake of a temporary respite. But these premises are untrue. People who have a much closer contact with Arab public opinion than I have, have no doubt warned you of the danger of believing that the present quiescence and tranquility of the Arab people in Palestine and outside Palestine will continue. Every day some sort of outbreak grows nearer. I do not know what form it will take. It may or it may not take the obvious form of a rising in Palestine, but there is no doubt at all that some sort of violent reaction in some part of the Arab world will be expected, must be expected, to the attempt to continue the Zionist policy in Palestine.

The second argument which might be used in favor of such proposals is one which is based upon the evidence given to you by Dr. Notestein in America. Dr. Notestein, I believe, gave evidence to the effect that the natural increase of the Arab population was so much greater than that of the Jewish population that there was no possibility of the Jews ever obtaining a majority in Palestine, or, if by chance they obtained it, of preserving it. Thus, what is necessary is to tide over the next few years and then the problem will solve itself, because it will become clear that the Jews can never be in the majority. The Arab fears are therefore unjustified and will ultimately disappear, and the Jewish hopes are therefore unbased and will ultimately be given up. To this argument there are various objections. I do not speak about the factual basis of it, because I am not competent to judge, but one may point out that there are more ways than one of obtaining a majority. The Arabs are bound to remember that in the past few years responsible Zionists have talked seriously about the evacuation of the Arab population, or part of it, to other parts of the Arab world. It may be that their statements have been disowned by the Jewish Agency or by other responsible bodies, but nevertheless the possibility does exist, and the Arabs are bound to accept it very seriously. Again it must be emphasized that what the Zionists want is a state, political domination, and they are therefore prepared to do anything to get it. Everything else is political strategy. Thus in the past they used the method of economic absorptive capacity in order to obtain immigration, and thus they will use the democratic argument if possible. If they can obtain a state by way of having a majority, that might seem simpler and it would enable them to justify their action in the eyes of the British and the American public. But if they cannot obtain a state and political domination by way of having a majority, they will try to obtain it in some other way, either by violence or by securing an artificial domination supported from outside.

It may be that these objections to the various alternative solutions would be accepted, but that it would be pointed out that similar objections might be made also to the Arab proposals. The first is that if Great Britain and the United States accepted the Arab proposals, this would be, in fact, to concede one of the two extreme positions. And this, it might be urged, would be unfair to the Jews and unacceptable to the British and American publics. In reality, the Arab proposals are not extreme but are a compromise. For twenty-five years

the Arabs have been protesting violently against the attempt to impose Zionist immigration upon them. Immigration has been forced upon them against their will and without their consent. Now, speaking through their responsible leaders, they declare again and again their willingness to accept those Jews who have entered Palestine legally and acquired Palestinian citizenship legally as full members of the political unity which they wish to form. They declare their willingness to enter into full community with their Jewish fellow-citizens of Palestine to try the dangerous experiment of people of different races and ideals living together. The generosity of this offer should not be underestimated. If it is not a compromise, what is?

Secondly, it might be asked what could the Jews expect under Arab rule in a self-governing Palestinian state with an Arab character? To this it should be enough to refer to the minutes of the proceedings of the 1939 Conference—which I believe are already in your hands—when Jamil Effendi Husayni, speaking as spokesman of the Arab delegation, made clear that what the Jews could expect would be full civil and political rights, control of their own communal affairs, municipal autonomy in districts in which they are mainly concentrated, the use of Hebrew as an additional official language in those districts, and an adequate share in the administration. It should be clear from this that there is no question of the Jews being under Arab rule in the bad sense of being thrust into a ghetto, or being cut off from the main stream of life of the community, always shunned and sometimes oppressed. The Arabs are offering not this ghetto status in the bad sense, but membership of the Palestinian community. If that community has an Arab character, if the Palestinian state is to be an Arab state, that is not because of racial prejudice or fanaticism but because of two inescapable facts: the first that Palestine has an Arab indigenous population, and the second that Palestine by geography and history is an essential part of the Arab world.

It might be replied to this that no terms the Arabs could offer would be adequate compensation for giving up the idea of a Jewish state. The whole point of Zionism, it might be said, is that the Jews should be in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance, and that this is impossible so long as they are in a minority and have not a state. This antithesis of right and sufferance is meaningless. The true antithesis is between goodwill and force: whether the Jews wish to live in Palestine with the goodwill of the Arabs, or whether they wish to rely on force, their own or others. What the Arabs are asking is not that the Jews should be here on sufferance in the bad sense, but that they should recognize their need for Arab goodwill. This is not humiliating to the Jews, to recognize that they are dependent on normal, good relations with Arabs. Moreover, it is true that the Jews here in Palestine do need the Arab goodwill, and even if they were here by right that would not make any difference at all to this fundamental fact.

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The third and most searching objection to the Arab proposals takes the form of a question. The Arab proposals, it might be said, are all very well in principle, but could they, in fact, be carried out except by force? Would the Zionists accept them? Would they not revolt against the attempt to deprive them of their possibility of establishing a Jewish state? And if they revolted, would it not be difficult to repress their revolt, either because of the military risks involved or else because of the immediate outcry from British and American public opinion, which no doubt would be misled by Zionist propaganda, whereby they would be led to believe that methods of repression were being used by the Arab administration? The answer is clear, that there is a serious risk involved, just as there is a risk involved in any solution of the Palestine problem. The precise nature and extent of it are matters on which I believe you have already heard the evidence of the competent authorities, but this much can be said with certainty: that whatever risk there is will be greater in [the] future than it is now, just as it is greater now than it was five or ten years ago. Nothing will be gained by waiting, but much will be lost. If there is a risk of violence now, there will be a certainty of it if you wait much longer. There are either of two alternatives: either the extremist organizations on the Jewish side are bluffing, and then it will be best to call their bluff before it turns into reality, or else they are not bluffing, and then it is better that the reckoning should come now rather than in a few years time. Every day which passes, the [Jewish] Agency and its affiliated organizations become stronger, and it becomes more difficult to dislodge them from their position. Under the Mandatory rule and with the acquiescence of the Mandatory Authorities, the Agency is preparing to seize power. There can be no lasting peace in Palestine until the teeth of this monstrous organization are drawn.

To this, another point may be added. I believe that whatever immediate troubles may break out, sooner or later the Jews in Palestine will have to recognize that they need Arab goodwill and will try to win it, but they will never do this until they are convinced that they have no alternative but good relations with the Arabs. So long as the state of Palestine is not definitely settled, so long as no national government exists, so long as the Zionists still hope for a state, they will refuse to take the steps necessary to win Arab friendship. The definitive settlement of a problem in the only way in which it can be settled, by the establishment of a national government, may or may not arouse immediate violence but it will certainly bring into existence the first and essential condition for an ultimate understanding between Arabs and Jews. It is worthwhile emphasizing this point, because it makes clear one important aspect of the problem. There is a certain inclination in Great Britain and America to state the problem in terms of the conflict of two races and two nationalisms, and to picture the British and American governments as impartial peacemakers and judges in no way involved in the conflict, but holding the two antagonists apart and doing justice between them. This is not the correct view. You will never understand the problem aright unless you realize that Great Britain and America are essentially involved in it. They are not only judges, they are also actors in the tragedy.

There can be no settlement, no final settlement, until the Zionists realize that they can never hope to obtain in London or Washington what is denied them in Jerusalem.

So much for the various solutions of the problem and the various objections to them.

In closing, I should like to emphasize what must be present in all our minds, that ultimately this is not a political or an economic problem to be decided only by political or economic criteria; ultimately and inescapably it is a moral question. There is a question of right and justice involved. And, more than that, what is done or not done in Palestine will deeply affect the system of moral relationships between the Arabs, the Jews, and the Western world.

Firstly, the relationship between the Arabs and the Jews. No honest Zionist can deny that the Jews have been well-treated throughout history in the Arab world. It was here that they found refuge when they were turned out of Spain—not a refuge given to strangers. They became part of the Arab universal community, and Arabic became their language. No Arab would wish to destroy the good relations which have always existed between Arabs and Jews if the Jews still care to accept them. If there is tension in various parts of the Arab world, if relations are not so good as they were or as we all should like them to be, that is entirely due to political Zionism.

Secondly, the relation between the Jews and the Gentile world. And here, if you will allow me, I would like to speak for a moment not as a member of the Arab Office, but as one who was nurtured in the European Christian tradition, and who feels deeply and personally the guilt and suffering of the Jews, and who would do nothing in the world to irritate the wounds of a hurt people. Quite apart from the Arab objections, I am not convinced that Zionism is the solution of the Jewish problem, or that the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine would improve relations between the Jews and the Gentile world. My views on this point have been put before you in a memorandum called, "Is Zionism the Solution of the Jewish Problem?" which I believe you have before you, and I do not intend to go into detail about it. But I wish to mention two queries which were in my mind. The first is whether, in fact, Zionism does not involve a despair of Europe and European democracy; whether it is not the turning away from Europe and all that it means; whether it is not a confession that Europe has failed, that European democracy is no more than a sham, and that the Jews can never, never live in tolerance and good relations in Europe. The second query is a query whether, even if a Jewish state were established in Palestine, the Jews would become a normal nation like all nations. I do not believe that the unlikeness of the Jews is due simply to a combination of political, economic, and social causes. I believe it lies much deeper than that and can ultimately only be explained in theological or metaphysical terms. And it seems to me that if the Zionists came back to Palestine and had their dream of a Jewish state, their unlikeness and all that gives rise to troubles to themselves and others would change its form, perhaps not for the better.

Finally, the relations between the Arabs and the West. Here, again, my views on this subject have been fully expounded in the various written evidence, and I do not need to go into detail about them. But it seems clear to me that the main task of the Arabs today is to come to terms with Western civilization and with the new Westernized world which is coming into existence. And Arabs are faced today with a choice between paths: either they can go out towards the West and towards the world in openness and receptiveness, trying to take from the West what is of most value and greatest depth in its tradition, and blend it with what they have of their own, trying to establish a relationship of tolerance and trust between them and the Western nations with whom they are brought into contact, and trying to enter into the new world community on a level of equality and in spirit of cooperation. Or else they can turn away from the West and from the world, in spiritual isolation and in hatred, taking nothing from the outside world except the material means with which to combat it.

I believe the first path is the path that Arabs must follow, and that the responsible leaders among them want to follow. Nevertheless the attitude which the Arabs will take up towards the West is not entirely a matter for the Arabs themselves; it depends very largely upon the attitude which the West takes up towards them. And it is at this point that Zionism comes in. Zionism for the Arabs has become a test of Western intentions, and so long as the grievance, the intolerable grievance, of Zionism exists, it will be impossible for the Arabs to establish that relationship of tolerance and respect, of trust and cooperation, with the world and to live at peace with themselves and their neighbors. And it will be impossible for that Arab nation—progressive, tranquil, contented, and stable—to come into existence for which we all hope, and to which we are all trying to work.